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NOTES
INCREASED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY FOR THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CRIME
INTRODUCTION
Observers have long recognized the extent to which administra-
tive action pervades modern economic and legal life.1 While the
Constitution's text entrusts Congress with all legislative powers
granted the federal government,2 it cannot be denied that among
the panoply of administrative powers now exercised by agencies are
rule-making functions that operate almost exactly like legislation.
Agencies can enact rules and regulations that are binding on all and
are the law of the land.
The power of agencies to promulgate rules that define criminal
conduct under certain statutes3 is problematic. During the first cen-
tury of United States history, only Congress could define criminal
conduct.4 Criminal laws have always been treated specially in the
United States, as reflected in the Constitution.5 Only Congress was
believed to understand the peculiar community approbation in-
1 See, e.g., Reginald Parker, Why do Administrative Agencies Exist?, 45 GEO. LJ. 331,
361 (1957) (" 'Government by Decree' is an indisputable necessity in the 20th century in
a country [the size of the United States].").
2 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
3 A fairly obscure, but quite representative, statute authorizing administrative
crimes is the Atlantic Salmon Convention Act of 1982, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608 (1988).
Section 3604(a) delegates in fairly broad terms the power to enact regulations to the
Secretary of Commerce, who under the act "shall promulgate such regulations ... as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Convention and this Chapter." 16
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988). Section 3606(b)(2) then provides, inter alia, that violation of
regulations promulgated under the Act are punishable by criminal penalties of a fine of
not more than $50,000 or imprisonment of up to six months. Id. § 3606(b)(2).
Other administrative crimes are more serious. For example, willful violations of
regulations promulgated under section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1988), can result in up to ten years imprisonment. SEC rule lOb-5
may be the most prominent administrative crime of all. Governing, inter alia, insider
trading, this rule fueled the downfall of Ivan Boesky.
4 Congressional power to define crimes is sharply limited by the text of the Consti-
tution; Congress can only create federal crimes that relate to federal lands and certain
substantive areas, such as interstate commerce. Nonetheless, given the almost limitless
Commerce Clause power Congress now enjoys, federal criminal law has become both
voluminous and important. See WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 2.8 (1986).
5 See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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volved in creating crimes.6 In the early twentieth century, however,
the exclusivity of the crime-making power eroded, and Congress
and the Supreme Court recognized the administrative power to de-
fine the conduct prohibited by criminal statutes.7 The justification
for this change was based on a belief that Congress, in enacting stat-
utes regulating areas of conduct and containing criminal penalties,
"created" the crime. Agencies merely filled in the details of an es-
tablished regulatory framework.8
Upon this narrow foundation, agencies have constructed a wide
range of "administrative crimes." But in the interim, the primary
tool with which all administrative power is checked-judicial re-
view-has become blunted. Supreme Court case law now instructs
reviewing courts to treat the bulk of agency actions with deference
and thereby to respect administrative expertise. 9 Under the current
deferential regime, challenges to agency rulemaking only succeed
when such rules are either clearly precluded by statute or manifestly
unreasonable.' 0
This Note argues that such deference is inappropriate in the
context of challenges to criminal rulemaking, because the policies
underlying judicial deference are of diluted force and are out-
weighed by policies peculiar to criminal law. Instead, this Note will
argue that reviewing courts should consider de novoII whether a
particular criminal rule falls within the grant of power authorized in
Congress's delegation. Part I discusses why criminal laws are given
special treatment generally and reviews the historical basis to treat-
ing administrative crimes specifically in a special light. Part II re-
views the separation of powers basis for agency rulemaking in
general. Part III surveys the current standards for judicial review of
agency rulemaking and explains why the policies underlying the cur-
rent deferential standard are of limited applicability when criminal
regulations are involved. Finally, Part IV illustrates a proposed
6 See infra notes 20-22, 37-54 and accompanying text.
7 See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (ruling that Congress acted
within its constitutional power in delegating to the Secretary of Agriculture the power to
make rules for the lawful use of forest reservations).
8 See id. at 517.
9 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) ("When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, .. . the challenge
must fail.").
10 Id. at 842-43.
11 "De novo," as used in this Note, means "without deference to the agency," not
the complete redetermination of all issues as found, but rarely employed, in § 706(2)(F)
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1988). See Kevin M. Cler-
mont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1115, 1131 n.71 (1987).
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higher standard of review for administrative crimes and discusses
potential criticisms of that standard.
I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CRIME: WHY is IT SPECIAL?
Why are any special protections needed for administrative
crimes, as opposed to other agency rules? Crimes have always rep-
resented a special case, constitutionally and philosophically. 12 The
criminal penalty represents the ultimate governmental intrusion on
individual freedom,13 together with a sense of community approba-
tion not present in other government action. Section A of this Part
will explain the constitutional and philosophical bases for the
unique treatment of crimes. Because of the special nature of crimi-
nal penalties, initially the Supreme Court carefully scrutinized ad-
ministrative crimes to ensure that Congress, not the agency, could
fairly be considered responsible for determining what constituted a
crime. Section B of this Part will trace the historical basis for treat-
ing administrative crimes in a different manner than other adminis-
trative actions.
A. Why are Crimes Special?
The Framers of the Constitution believed that the criminal
sanction deserved special safeguards not necessary for other gov-
ernmental actions.14 Many of these safeguards are procedural in na-
ture: examples include the Fifth Amendment's grand jury
requirement; the Double Jeopardy, Self-Incrimination, and Due
Process Clauses; 5 and the Sixth Amendment's right to ajury and to
counsel.16 Article I also places substantive restrictions on the power
to make crimes by barring bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.' 7
Some of these protections found their origin in the bitter memory of
12 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 2 at 3 (1946) ("A crime is a...
wrong of such a public character that the sovereignty, the authority, and majesty of the
entire body politic, prosecutes the offender as one who has committed a wrong against
its peace and dignity").
13 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 250 (1968) (dis-
cussing why, considering the traditional role of criminal law, it should be reserved for
what "really matters").
14 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511-12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (rebutting criticism of the absence of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution,
Hamilton notes the Constitution's protection of the writ of habeas corpus as a safeguard
against the "arbitrary imprisonment" that constitutes "the favorite and most formidable
instrument[] of tyranny.").
15 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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arbitrary action by the King's executive agents."' Among the many
grievances with colonial government the Constitution sought to re-
dress, those concerning criminal laws were prominent.
It is also significant that early in its history the Constitution was
held to bar judicially created crimes.' 9 Common-law crimes were
recognized in England and in many state courts, but in United States
v. Hudson & Goodwin20 the Supreme Court held that these crimes
were beyond the power of the federal courts. The Court's decision
rested primarily on the limited jurisdiction granted the courts under
the Constitution. 2' However, the effect of the decision was that only
the legislature could create crimes in the federal government.
This holding was consistent with the traditional concept of
crime. Crimes were thought to differ from other sanctionable ac-
tions because they carried with them a sense of moral approba-
tion.22 "What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all
that distinguishes it ... is the judgment of community condemna-
tion which accompanies -and justifies its imposition." 23 The deter-
mination of "community condemnation" is not within the realm of
administrative expertise, 24 but rather is wholly within the province
of the legislative branch.
Among the many rules granting special protection to the crimi-
nal defendant, the rule of lenity is particularly important to the pres-
ent discussion. This rule requires that a court resolve statutory25
and regulatory26 ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants. In
challenges to the validity of administrative crimes, the rule appears
to conflict directly with the modem judicial policy of deference to
18 See Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371,
374 (1976).
19 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 33. Hudson & Goodwin addressed whether the federal circuit courts had
jurisdiction over criminal libel claims against the government. The Court held they did
not, emphasizing the limited jurisdiction giverk federal courts, particularly inferior fed-
eral courts, under the Constitution. "The legislative authority of the Union must first
make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have
jurisdiction of the offense." Id. at 34.
22 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 401,
404 (1958).
23 Id.
24 "[There are no real values experts." Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a
Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 1101, 1121 (1988).
25 See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971).
26 See Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 621 (1946) (stating in dicta that
the same rules of construction governing statutes apply to administrative rules and
regulations).
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the agency construction of organic statutes. 27 The doctrines are at
odds to the extent that the agency interpretation that provides the
justification for a criminally punishable rule resolves otherwise am-
biguous language to the detriment of the defendant.
United States v. Bass28 sets forth the reasons supporting the len-
ity policy. 29 Bass was convicted for violating a provision of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 barring ex-
convicts from "receiv[ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] in com-
merce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm." °30 The Court ad-
dressed whether a conviction could stand without a showing that the
firearm in question was either in commerce or affected commerce.3 1
The Court failed to discern any clear congressional intent3 2 and ap-
plied the rule of lenity to reverse the conviction. The rule, Justice
Marshall wrote, was founded on two policies.33 First, defendants
should have fair warning of conduct prohibited by law.3 4 "Second,
because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because crimi-
nal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activ-
ity."3 5 Thus, the rule rests in part on the idea that only Congress
should define what conduct is so deserving of community condem-
nation that the criminal sanction is appropriate. The policy for ap-
plying the rule of lenity in the administrative context seems even
stronger than for statutory crimes since administrative crimes allow
a nonlegislative branch to determine what types of conduct should
be subject to criminal sanction.
B. The Evolution of the Administrative Crime
The Supreme Court first dealt with the interplay between the
criminal law and delegation to administrative agencies in 1891 in
United States v. Eaton.3 6 Eaton, a margarine wholesaler, was prose-
cuted under section 18 of the Oleomargarine Act 3 7 for failing to
27 See infra notes 204-21 and accompanying text. An agency's "Organic Statute"
creates the agency and grants it whatever power it has.
28 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
29 Note that the rule of lenity is a policy, not a constitutional command. See id. at
348. Thus, the rule cannot compel the abandonment of the deference approach when the
doctrines collide, though it does add another reason for rejecting deference when ad-
ministrative crimes are at issue.
30 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1), (5) (1988).
31 404 U.S. at 338.
32 Id. at 339-47.
33 Id. at 348.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 144 U.S. 677 (1891).
37 24 Stat. 209 (1886) (repealed 1939).
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keep records required "by law."38 The law requiring such records
was a regulation of the Treasury Department; the statute authorized
the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations necessary to
implement the act.3 9 The issue before the court was whether a crim-
inal conviction could follow from failure to comply with procedures
not required by statute.
The Court held that it could not.40 In so doing, the Court first
noted the absence of common-law crimes in federal court, thus em-
phasizing the necessity of statutory authority for federal crimes.4 1
The Court then cited precedent that established that administrative
regulations could only implement statutes, but could not in any way
alter them.42 The Court further stated that the rule's application
was particularly important in criminal cases:
Much more does this principle apply to a case where it is sought
substantially to prescribe a criminal offence by the regulation of a
department. It is a principle of criminal law that an offence which
may be the subject of criminal procedure is an act committed or
omitted "in violation of a public law, either forbidding or com-
manding it.... It is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority
should exist for declaring any act or omission a criminal
offence[.]" '43
Thus, the general requirement that rules promulgated by an ad-
ministrative agency fit tightly within their statutory scheme was only
part of the Court's decision. The special requirements for criminal
law also required invalidation of any rule that, on close scrutiny, was
not mandated by Congress. 44
In re Kollock 45 was the first case approving a criminal conviction
for violation of an administrative rule. This approval, however, fell
well within the standard of review used in Eaton. As in Eaton, the
defendant in Kollock was prosecuted for a violation of the Oleomar-
garine Act. The prosecution charged the defendant with violating a
provision of the statute that proscribed selling margarine unless it
was "marked stamped and branded as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue... shall prescribe." 46 Kollock sold margarine in packages
without such stamps, but argued that the statute impermissibly dele-
38 Id. § 16.
39 144 U.S. at 685.
40 Id. at 688.
41 kL at 687.
42 Id. (citing Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 467 (1882)).
43 Id. at 687-88 (citation omitted).
44 Id. at 688. See infra notes 204-21 and accompanying text.
45 165 U.S. 526 (1896).
46 Id. at 532 (quoting the Oleomargarine Act, 24 Stat. 209 (1886) (repealed 1939)).
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gated to the Commissioner the power to define a criminal offense.47
The Court held that "[t]he criminal offence [was] fully and com-
pletely defined by the act and the designation by the Commissioner
of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of
detail."'48 A close look at the statute revealed that the defendent
committed a statutory crime, not an administrative one; the agency
merely filled in gaps of minutia.
The agency role in defining a crime was much larger in United
States v. Grimaud.49 Credited as the case that gave birth to the ad-
ministrative crime,50 Grimaud involved a prosecution for illegally al-
lowing sheep to graze on government lands.5 1 Although the statute
defined the proscribed activity and provided for the appropriate
punishment, regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture defined which government properties were off-limits. 52
The Court likened this scheme to that in Kollock, calling the se-
lection of prohibited sites "a matter of administrative detail."53
Congress defined the activity to be regulated as well as the punish-
ment. The agency merely detailed the circumstances that created
the activity. Clearly, though, the Grimaud agency's role in selecting
which government sites were off-limits was of a more significant
character than the Kollock agency's package-defining rule. The
Grimaud Court focused on whether delegation of power to the
agency by Congress was legislative or administrative. The Court
took the same care in examining whether Congress had authorized
the regulation as it had in Eaton. However, after determining that
Congress had authorized the regulation and that the delegation was
of administrative, not legislative, character, the Court let the regula-
tion stand. "[T]he authority to make administrative rules is not a
delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an
administrative to a legislative character because the violation
thereof is punished as a public offense." 54 Thus, Eaton and Grimaud
established that the use of criminal penalties in regulation did not
dispositively determine whether the power delegated was legislative
or administrative. The criminal character of the regulations, how-
ever, was important in determining the scrutiny necessary to ensure
47 Id. at 533.
48 Id.
49 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
50 See Edmund H. Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, its Creation and Punishment by
Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REv. 51, 59 (1943).
51 220 U.S. at 513.
52 Id. at 520.
53 Id. at 516.
54 Id. at 521.
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that the agency did not exceed whatever power had been delegated
to it.
Since Eaton, the Court has not directly addressed the special
problems that arise when a court reviews agency regulations that are
punishable by criminal penalties. In these early cases, however, the
Court closely scrutinized such regulations to determine whether
they were authorized by Congress. 55 Eaton suggested that this was
due in part to the regulations' criminal character. This Note argues
that the Court's approach in Eaton's was entirely proper.56
II
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no lib-
erty .... Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not
separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with
the legislative, the life ind liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator.
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression. There would be an end to every-
thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of
enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of try-
ing the causes of individuals.57
Montesquieu's words resonated loudly in the minds of the
Framers,58 for the liberal political philosophy he expounded seemed
a particularly appropriate safeguard after a long struggle to escape
the oppression of a despotic monarch.59 Moreover, in the years be-
tween the Revolutionary War and the drafting of the Constitution,
the Framers witnessed a second form of tyranny, that of state legis-
lators with runaway control over state government.60 Separation of
powers was thus a vital concept to the Constitution they drafted:
"All legislative Powers. . . shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States;6 1 ... The executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
55 See also United States v. George, 228 U.S. 14, 22 (1913) ("Where the charge is of
crime, it must have clear legislative basis.").
56 See infra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
57 BARON MONTESQUIEU, DE L'EsPRrr DES Lois, quoted in M. J. C. VILE, CONsTrru-
TIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 90 (1967).
58 Madison wrote in his first separation of powers essay in the Federalist Papers that
Montesquieu was "[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject." THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
59 See Levi, supra note 18, at 373-74.
60 Id. at 374-75. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310-11 (James Madison) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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dent of the United States of America;62 ... The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court. '63
The Framers did not, however, envision a constitutional system
in which the three branches were to be kept wholly separate from
one another.64 Rather, they foresaw an interdependent system of
checks and balances designed to prevent one branch from usurping
the function of another.65 As Madison wrote, "unless these depart-
ments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitu-
tional control over the others, the degree of separation... essential
to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained." 66
However, the Framers did not envision the most important separa-
tion of powers problem of the modem era-the administrative
state.67
Thus, courts and commentators have struggled ever since to
find a proper role for administrative agencies commensurate with
62 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
63 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-09 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
65 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320-23 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
66 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
67 In executing their statutory mandates to implement regulatory schemes, admin-
istrative agencies perform two broad types of functions-adjudication and rulemaking.
See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 550 (1988). Generally, adjudica-
tion concerns matters of individual import, whereas rulemaking usually has general ap-
plication. See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973)
(discussing the differences between adjudication and rulemaking). Rulemaking under
the APA can apply to particular parties, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988), but this has no signifi-
cance for the discussion of administrative crimes, since a rule applicable only to a partic-
ular party and imposing criminal sanctions would violate the Constitution's Bill of
Attainder Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 3. Rules are sometimes categorized as
"legislative," that is, promulgated under a specific delegation of power from Congress,
or "interpretive," that is, rules issued without the force of law, but useful as a guide to
the agency's beliefs about its organic statute. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE 99 7.8-.10 (2d ed. 1979). However, the continuing vitality of the distinc-
tion is called into question by Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). See infra notes 204-22 and accompanying text. The definition of
administrative crimes relates almost exclusively to the rulemaking function, because ad-
ministrative agencies cannot adjudicate matters involving penal sanctions. See, e.g.,
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (issuing habeas corpus writ on behalf
of Chinese immigrants who were subjected to hard labor and deportation after being
adjudged to be in the country unlawfully by a summary proceeding before a court or
executive officer). Moreover, the Court generally has shown more concern over ensur-
ing the validity of quasi-judicial adjudication than quasi-legislative rulemaking, largely
because adjudicating matters of individual rights directly implicates due process. See,
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (adopting due process test for administra-
tive adjudication, which balances the due process rights of the litigant against the prod-
uct of the cost of more process and its utility in the particular situation). The distinction
between adjudication and rulemaking is important, because of the different concerns the
Court emphasizes in reviewing each activity; a decision affecting one function might not
carry over to the other.
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the Constitution's separation of powers. Two leading schools of
thought regarding the role of agencies have emerged from this
struggle.68 The "traditional school" views agencies as necessary ad-
juncts to congressional legislation, required because Congress lacks
the flexibility and expertise to deal with the complex issues that con-
tinually arise in the course of a regulatory scheme.69 The "new
school" focuses instead on the relative accountability of the three
branches, reasoning that Congress generally abandons its responsi-
bility to resolve controversial policy choices because of re-election
motives. 70 By this view, the role of agencies and courts is evaluated
according to their relative abilities to fill the vacuum left by
Congress.
A. The Constitutional Role of the Agency: Two Schools of
Thought
1. The Traditional School: The Agency as Expert
The administrative state in its present form traces back to the
New Deal. That era experienced the creation of a wide range of
administrative agencies whose special expertise, it was hoped, would
lead the nation out of the Depression through skillful administration
of regulatory statutes. 7' Courts proved quite willing to defer to the
purported expertise of agencies under the prevailing economic con-
ditions; agencies would claim an issue needed resolution in their
favor to implement statutory goals, and nonexpert courts were loath
to contradict them.72 This conception of administrative agencies
provides one explanation for modem judicial deference to agency
interpretations of their own organic statutes, because these inter-
pretations are "so bound up with successful administration of the
regulatory scheme that it may seem only sensible to give principal
interpretive responsibility to the 'expert' agency that lives with the
statute constantly."'73
A second rationale behind the traditional school's approach
recognizes that agencies are inherently more flexible than Con-
68 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administra-
tive Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 491 (1985). It should be noted that in practice, theories of
both schools guide separation of powers jurisprudence as it pertains to agencies, and
that many commentators espouse elements of each.
69 Id. at 490-91.
70 Id. at 491.
71 See Aman, supra note 24, at 1111-21.
72 Id. at 1121-22.
73 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453 (1989).
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gress. 74 Important policy issues in regulated areas arise too quickly
for Congress to address them adequately. 75 Thus, agencies, able to
respond far more quickly than Congress, fill in the statutory gaps.
This greater flexibility also allows agencies to experiment with dif-
ferent solutions to a problem in a manner Congress could not ac-
complish efficiently.76
Neither rationale advanced by the traditional school is persua-
sive when applied in the administrative crime context. While many,
if not most, agency actions involve value judgments, 77 making rules
punishable by criminal sanctions involves a special kind of value
judgment: what conduct does society deem so blameworthy as to
deserve its highest measure of condemnation? 78 The expertise the-
ory of administrative agencies is problematic when used to resolve
any value judgment, 79 but is particularly difficult when the determi-
nation of societal mores is at issue. Agencies have no expertise to
determine what conduct deserves the criminal penalty.
Moreover, flexibility is not a virtue when criminal penalties are
at issue. There is a historical basis for arguing that flexibility is an
undesirable attribute of any legislative decision: in advocating the
President's veto power, Hamilton wrote that one factor militating in
favor of such power was to
increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing
of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener
the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diver-
sity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must
be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due
deliberation .... 80
Agencies, whose procedures for enacting rules are far simpler
than those Congress must follow to pass statutes,8' are therefore at
74 See Aman, supra note 24, at 1108 ("In many ways, the best and the worst that can
be said for substantive agency law is that it is disposable.").
75 See generally Pierce, supra note 68.
76 Aman, supra note 24, at 1108.
77 See Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
VA. L. REV. 271, 281 (1986).
78 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
79 See Aman, supra note 24, at 1221.
80 THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
81 Compare § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988), re-
quiring agencies to provide mere notice of a proposed rulemaking and an opportunity
to comment on it for procedural validity (§ 556 imposes stricter procedural standards
for rules promulgated under statutory authority, requiring a hearing "on the record,"
but such formal rulemaking is rarely employed), with U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 7, requiring
approval of both Congress and the President (or, in the absence of presidential ap-
proval, a super-majority vote by each branch) for statutory validity. The driving philoso-
phy behind the required procedures is that checks are necessary to ensure that Congress
622 [Vol. 77:612
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greater risk of making "bad laws" than Congress. The hope that
agencies also stand a better chance of making good laws may be
sufficient to outweigh this fear in the general case; certainly this view
informs the traditional school. Yet this trial-and-error approach
conflicts with the great care criminal law exercises on the defen-
dant's behalf to ensure that the criminal penalty is not imposed by
mistake. 82 Shifting laws might cause notice problems, but more fun-
damentally, substantive experimentation is anathema to the notions
of moral culpability that underlie criminal law.
2. The New School: The Agency as Political Entity
The new school looks to the political and institutional sources
of agency power, rather than to its functional utility.83 This ap-
proach assumes that congressional delegation of power to agencies
lacks real standards chiefly because its members are motivated by
re-election and therefore avoid making controversial decisions out
of fear that doing so might harm their re-election bids.84 Because
this view assumes Congress has abdicated its value-deciding role,
the new school's focus of inquiry shifts to how best to control the
does not monopolize governmental power and thereby enact unsound legislation. See
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 73
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). While this philosophy is under-
mined to some extent by any agency action carrying legislative effect, the absence of
checks and balances is particularly troubling when the rationales advanced to justify
agency rulemaking are not implicated, as is the case when administrative crimes are
involved.
82 A worthwhile analogy can be made to the burden of proof required at civil and
criminal trials. Civil trials generally employ a "more-probable-than-not" standard, while
criminal trials use a "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard. Outcome errors-convic-
tion of the innocent, or acquittal of the guilty-will occur less frequently in the long
term under the former test, since the scales are not tilted either way. Nonetheless, our
system rests on the belief that the harm suffered from defendant-borne criminal errors
warrants the added protection for criminal defendants. By the same token, wide-rang-
ing agency experimentation with various rules could be expected, over the long term, to
produce the best regulatory scheme, but the mistakes of such a trial-and-error system
(bad rules) cause concern when the effects of those mistakes will be borne by criminal
defendants.
83 This approach is derived from a broader movement that evaluates the role of
private interests in public policymaking, which spawned deregulation as well as broad
deference to agency decisionmaking. See Linda R. Hirshman, PostmodernJurisprudence and
the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 N.W.U. L. REV. 646, 646-47 (1988).
84 See Pierce, supra note 68, at 491. See also Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982). Writing from an economic perspec-
tive, these authors argue that legislators choose to delegate in order to reduce their
decision costs (the costs of acquiring information to make a decision and the costs of the
detrimental effects that decision might have), although doing so increases agency costs
(the inevitable costs attributable to an agent having different goals than the principal).
Id. at 6.
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political decisions of administrative agencies.8 5 This is a question of
power which, when framed in this manner, tends to undercut the
role of courts in controlling administrative agencies in favor of the
executive branch. The approach assumes that although Congress is
the most politically accountable branch, when it abdicates its policy-
making role, another branch must exercise its power. The executive
branch, which is politically accountable through the President, is
considered a better actor than the unelected judiciary.8 6 This con-
cept of agency power underlies the modern approach ofjudicial def-
erence to agency interpretations of organic statutes.8 7
Even if one assumes that in the general case the new school
takes the proper approach, the approach's validity is suspect when
applied to administrative crimes. This is true for two reasons: First,
as was true for the traditional school's flexibility explanation, crimi-
nal law permits fewer defendant-harming errors than does civil
law.8 8 Thus, errors caused by allowing a less accountable decision-
maker to determine criminally blameworthy conduct are intolerable
in the criminal sphere even if acceptable in the civil sphere. Second,
the accumulation of power inherent in allowing the executive
branch to make the law becomes both more apparent and more
troublesome when criminal penalties are involved. The executive
branch prosecutes criminal cases; allowing the same branch to pro-
mulgate crimes would run afoul of the purpose of the separation of
powers: to curb undue government infringement on liberty.8 9 As
Montesquieu warned, "When the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,
there can be no liberty."
90
B. The Nondelegation Doctrine: A Failed Method of Judicial
Control Over Agency Action
The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a
positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what
85 See, e.g., James V. DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regula-
tory State, 72 VA. L. REv. 399 (1986). DeLong argues that the proper role of courts in the
administrative separation of powers problem is "to ensure that somebody somewhere in
the system performed adequate quality control and to recognize that the somebody
need not necessarily be a court." Id. at 417-18.
86 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) ("[Wlhile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Execu-
tive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of Government to make
such policy choices .. "); Pierce, supra note 68, at 506 (analyzing the basis for judicial
deference to administrative agencies in Chevron).
87 See infra notes 203-22 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 82.
89 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
90 MONTESQUIEU, quoted in VILE, supra note 57, at 93.
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that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and
not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to trans-
fer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.9 1
These words ofJohn Locke illustrate a pure form of separation
of powers, as would a literal reading of the opening clause of Article
I: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States. ' ' 92 The Court once acknowledged this
idea, at least in principle, through the nondelegation doctrine,
which bars the delegation of legislative power by Congress: "That
'Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and mainte-
nance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion.' 93 Yet the limited utility of this vehicle for policing the
apparent constitutional mandate provoked a leading commentator
to remark that "the statement that the nondelegation doctrine has
failed needs no qualification." 94 In only two cases has the Supreme
Court held that a grant -of power violated the nondelegation doc-
trine.9 5 The doctrine requires only that Congress express some "in-
telligible principle" 96  to guide an agency charged with
implementing a statute, but apparently, even that modest standard
no longer holds any force.9 7
Nonetheless, some judges98 and commentators9 9 have argued
that a return to some form of the nondelegation doctrine is neces-
sary. Reasons for this spring readily to mind: uneasiness remains
concerning the enormous law-making power agencies now wield,
while the arsenal of controls on agency power continues to
91 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Harlan Davidson ed., 1982).
92 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
93 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (quoting Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
94 KENNETH C. DAvIs, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 150-51 (2d ed.
1978).
95 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Both cases arose under the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) and involved the delegation of almost
limitless power to regulate industry and set prices.
96 J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
97 See DAVIS, supra note 94, § 3.5.
98 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
99 See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985); see also Aranson et al., supra note 84, at 63-67 (the nondelega-
tion doctrine should be revived as an instrument to block legislative delegations which
confer purely private benefits).
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shrink. 00 While many have voiced the need for a new nondelega-
tion doctrine, 0 '1 the approaches and justifications for such a doc-
trine vary significantly.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was among the first to call for a resur-
rection of the doctrine with his concurring opinion in Industrial
Union Dep 't v. Anerican Petroleum Inst. 10 2 In Industrial Union, the Chief
Justice argued that Congress improperly delegated power to the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Administration to determine accepta-
ble limits of Benzene, a hazardous substance. 03 He argued that the
determination of whether, and to what extent, costs of safety meas-
ures should be taken into account in deciding the necessity of regu-
lations was such a fundamental policy question that Congress could
not permissibly delegate it.104 Similarly, Professor David Schoen-
brod advocates drawing the nondelegation line at the delegation of
the power to set "goals," rather than "rules."' 05 Thus, both Rehn-
quist and Schoenbrod argue that fundamental policy choices dearly
represent legislative power and therefore cannot be constitutionally
delegated.' 0 6
Justice Scalia took a very different approach in his dissent to
Mistretta v. United States.'0 7 Mistretta involved a challenge to the
United States Sentencing Commission, which was created "as an in-
dependent commission in the judicial branch"' 08 to set uniform
sentences in order to alleviate the wide disparity then characterizing
judicial sentencing. The Court upheld this delegation. In his dis-
sent, Scalia argued that the Court had not abandoned the strict form
of separation of powers as espoused by Locke; instead, the Court
had merely consistently recognized that some discretion and lati-
tude inevitably results from executive power.
The whole theory of lawful congressional "delegation" is not that
Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore
100 Cf. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative vetoes of agency
actions unconstitutional as violative of separation of powers).
101 See, e.g., Aranson et al., supra note 94; Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process,
1988 DUKE L.J. 657; Schoenbrod, supra note 99.
102 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
103 448 U.S. at 672.
104 Id.
105 Schoenbrod, supra note 99, at 1248.
106 While this approach has the virtue of satisfying the Constitution's literal com-
mand, it would have the drawback of opening to litigation the validity of thousands of
delegations now resting in the United States Code. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE EIGHTIES § 3.1-.2, at 64 (1989).
107 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1982). See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368 (describing
the Sentencing Commission).
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assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather
that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres
in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by
the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to
determine-up to a point-how small or how large that degree
shall be.' 09
The Sentencing Commission, Scalia argued, had no independ-
ent constitutional authority for its actions. "The lawmaking func-
tion of the Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any
responsibility for execution of the law or adjudication of private
rights under the law."110 Its creation was a naked delegation of leg-
islative power, unlike the typical case in which Congress delegates a
power that in effect already existed. Although Scalia's approach
would not affect the most common type of delegation case, in which
Congress delegates authority to an executive agency, his approach
bases such delegation on a new theory that reconciles modern prac-
tice with classical theory.
Scalia's approach focuses on to whom power is delegated,
whereas Rehnquist and Schoenbrod concentrate on the extent of
power delegated. Another approach is possible: a limitation based
on the type of interest the delegated power affects."' For example,
since liberty is a highly valued interest, the power to delegate the
authority to promulgate rules punishable by criminal penalties
might be circumscribed. This type of approach has the appeal of
limiting certain types of governmental regulation to those govern-
ment officials directly elected by the people. Nevertheless this ap-
proach suffers from the same practical drawbacks as Justice
Rehnquist's in that it requires the invalidation of huge volumes of
law. Although the approach has received some limited support in
the past from commentators"12 and the judiciary,"13 no current
member of the Supreme Court has ever endorsed such a view.
109 488 U.S. at 417.
11o Id. at 420.
111 See Dripps, supra note 101, at 657; Lisa A. Cahill & J. Russell Jackson, Note,
Nondelegation Afer Mistretta: Phoenix or Phathon?, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1047 (1990);
Cf. Aranson et al., supra note 84, at 63 (arguing that a revitalized nondelegation doctrine
should be used to police delegations that serve purely private interests).
112 See Harlan S. Abrahams &John R. Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative
Crimes: A Study ofIrreconcilables, 1 So. IiL. U. L.J. 1 (1976) (arguing that the power to make
crimes is a.core function of the legislature and thus cannot be delegated); but see DAVIs,
supra note 94, § 3.11, at 191 ("[The Abrahams & Snowden article] has value as a collec-
tion of separation of powers literature that has little value.").
113 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in
result). Robe involved a delegation to the Secretary of Defense to classify worksites as
"defense facilities" that were to be off-limits to members of the Communist Party under
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 784 (a)(1)(D). Robel, a Com-
munist, was indicted for being willfully employed at a "defense facility" in violation of
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Thus, while administrative crimes lie on the borderline of per-
missible agency action, a nondelegation approach does not appear
to be the answer. Instead, close judicial supervision to ensure, inso-
far as is possible, that crimes created by administrative agencies are
within congressional purview seems a more appropriate check on
administrative crime-making power.1 4 But the nondelegation doc-
trine, which has never been overruled, remains at least in theory as
an outer limit on agency power.
III
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY REGULATIONS
Judicial review traditionally has been an integral element in the
valid delegation of power from Congress to administrative agen-
cies. 115 Indeed, one of the reasons for requiring Congress to articu-
late some "intelligible principle" ' 1 6 when delegating authority is to
give the courts some basis on which to judge whether an agency has
exceeded its statutory mandate. 1 7 Interestingly, a changed view of
political accountability has helped to undermine the role ofjudicial
review of administrative action. 18 Originally, courts reviewed agen-
cies to ensure that their actions could fairly be attributed to the leg-
islative branch. But the modem Supreme Court has backed away
from this position, asserting that while agencies are not as politically
accountable as Congress, they are still more accountable than the
the statute. Justice Brennan, while approving broad delegations of power in general,
argued that this delegation was impermissible given the criminal penalty and First
Amendment issues involved.
"The area of permissible indefiniteness narrows ... when the regula-
tion invokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental
rights.... Before we can decide whether it is an undue infringement of
protected rights to send a person to prison... it ought at least to appear
that Congress authorized the proscription as warranted and necessary."
389 U.S. at 275-77. See also State v. Maitrejean, 192 So. 361 (La. 1939); Howell v. State,
230 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. 1976) (state cases holding that administrative rules punishable by
criminal penalties are unconstitutional as violative of state constitutions).
114 See infra Part III.
115 See Farina, supra note 73, at 487.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 96.
117 See Schoenbrod, supra note 99, at 1239; Farina supra note 73, at 487.
118 See generally Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984). Komesar argues that in analyzing
judicial review of another branch of government, the allocation of decisionmaking and
the relative merits of decisionmaking between the institutions of government are often
overlooked. "Whenever a political decision is declared invalid, the judgment of the ju-
dicial branch has been substituted for that of other branches of government." Id. at 366.
He argues for a generally reduced role for the judicial branch, because even when courts
perceive a "political malfunction," they "should not abandon the presumption [of legis-
lative validity] unless [the court] in the given setting... can offer an alternative superior to
the defective legislative process." Id. at 376.
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judiciary, and thus should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt in
close cases.' 19
Yet there are independent reasons why judicial review should
retain an important role in the evaluation of administrative crimes.
Section A of this Part examines the special problem of statutory
schemes that preclude any review of regulations during trial. Sec-
tion B discusses the general standard of judicial review of agency
actions, as well as instances in which courts apply a higher standard
of review.
A. Unreviewable Regulations
Recognizing the traditional role of the judiciary as arbiter of
statutory interpretation, courts normally entertain a presumption of
reviewability for challenges to the validity of agency regulations. 120
Nonetheless, many statutes granting rulemaking powers to agencies
provide that some rules are either immune to challenge in litigation
or subject to challenge in only a limited fashion.1 21 Some courts
have been hesitant to enforce these "no-review" provisions when
criminal penalties are involved, 122 and this Section argues that this
is the proper approach. ,
Courts confronting a statute precluding or limiting judicial re-
view of administrative actions face a constitutional dilemma.1 2 3 One
horn of the dilemma hinges on the well-established role of courts in
adjudicating constitutional rights. "The supremacy of the Constitu-
tion . . . and the sanctity of the rights guarantied by it, none will
question."12 4 Yet the Constitution also grants Congress broad au-
thority over the jurisdiction of Article III courts, the dilemma's sec-
ond horn. "[Congress has the power of] investing... [courts] with
jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of with-
holding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good."' 2 5
119 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. See also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial
Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 283 (1986).
120 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1982) ("Except to the extent
that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law,
agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial
enforcement.").
121 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-5(b) (Supp. V 1970) (limit-
ing review of certain rules promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals within 30 days of such rules' promulgation, and
precluding review at enforcement proceedings).
122 See infra text accompanying notes 161-74, 189-93.
123 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit theJurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1367 (1953).
124 Id. (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 244 (3 How.) 244 (1845)).
125 Id.
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Thus, the denial ofjudicial review raises difficult issues as to the
enforceability both of constitutional rights, and of separation of
powers. 126 These concerns are magnified when criminal prosecu-
tions are involved.' 27 The process due criminal defendants is of a
greater magnitude than that due other litigants.1 28 Thus, the denial
of an element of this due process comes at a higher constitutional
price. Moreover, since it is the judiciary that imposes criminal pen-
alties, following no-review statutes in this context forces the courts
to fulfill their harshest obligation without the concurrent duty to en-
sure that a conviction satisfies the law. 129
The Supreme Court first faced this dilemma in Yakus v. United
States.'30 The case involved a Fifth Amendment challenge, raised
during a criminal prosecution, to regulations promulgated under
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.'3' The statute, designed
to control inflation during World War II,132 limited such challenges
to administrative hearings or to an Emergency Court of Appeals,
and then, barring new circumstances, only permitted challenges
within 60 days of the regulation's enactment.'3 3 Yakus argued that
the regulation he was convicted under, which barred the sale of
meat above an administratively fixed price, violated the Act, and that
precluding a chance for review of his claim at trial denied his right
to due process. 34
The Court rejected this challenge based on three grounds.
First, the wartime exigencies of the case required rejection: Con-
gress found a real possibility of runaway inflation, and wanted to
avoid the delays and potential inconsistencies that could result from
case-by-case attacks on the regulations. 135 The Court's two other
reasons, however, confronted the horns of the aforementioned di-
lemma, and resolved it in favor of the government.
The Court disposed of Yakus's due process challenge by analo-
gizing his situation to that of a litigant who waives the right to assert
a constitutional right by failing to raise it in a timely manner.' 3 6 Ya-
126 See Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional Limitations onJudicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L.
REv. 733 (1983) (arguing that the proper resolution of the dilemma is to allow preclu-
sion of review except when constitutional challenges are involved).
127 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 460 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
128 See id. at 473.
129 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 125 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring).
130 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
131 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C. app. § 901 (1988), as amended by the Inflation Control Act
of 1942, 56 Stat. 765, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 961-971 (1988).
132 321 U.S. at 419-20.
133 Id. at 428.
134 Id. at 431.
135 Id. at 431-32.
136 Id. at 444.
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kus, before violating the price regulation, could have challenged the
regulation in an administrative, hearing or before the Emergency
Court of Appeals. "A sufficient answer to [Yakus' due process chal-
lenge] ... is that petitioners have failed to seek the administrative
remedy and the statutory review which were open to them .... -137
Thus, the Court held that a criminal defendant's due process rights
are satisfied as long as an opportunity exists in some forum to chal-
lenge the validity of the law under which she is prosecuted.
The Yakus Court also based its decision on Congress's power to
define the jurisdiction over Article III courts.
Congress, through its power to define the jurisdiction of inferior
federal courts and to create such courts for the exercise of the
judicial power, could, subject to other constitutional limitations
... foreclose any .. consideration of the validity of a regulation
as a defense to a prosecution for its violation [other than by the
Emergency Court of Appeals].' 38
Thus, presuming the statute satisfied due process, Congress's power
over the jurisdiction of Article III courts authorized denial of judi-
cial review.
The latter two grounds for the Court's decision were attacked
in a spirited dissent by Justice Rutledge.139 Withholdingjudicial re-
view in this criminal prosecution, he argued, violated both due pro-
cess and the dictates of Article 111.140 Rutledge questioned the
constitutionality of forcing a criminal defendant to litigate an essen-
tial element of the crime in a separate forum or to forego such re-
view altogether.
The fact is that if he violates the regulation he must be convicted,
in a trial in which either an earlier and summary civil determina-
tion or the complete absence of a determination forecloses him on
a crucial constitutional question.... This may be all very well for
some civil proceedings. But, so far as I know, criminal proceed-
ings of this character never before have received the sanction of
Congress or of this Court.' 4 '
Rutledge argued that due process required more 42 and that Con-
gress's power over jurisdiction did not compel acceptance of the
Act's procedure. 143 Merely because Congress could withhold juris-
diction did not mean that it could bestow ajurisdiction so limited as
137 Id. at 434.
138 Id. at 443.
139 Id. at 460-89 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 468.
141 Id. at 478.
142 Id. at 479.
143 Id. at 467-68.
1992]
632 CORNELL LI W REVIEW [Vol. 77:612
to violate due process.1 4 4 The judicial power, once granted, must
include at a minimum the ability to adjudicate a criminal defendant's
constitutional challenges. 145
Shortly after Yakus, the Court in Estep v. United States 146 affirmed
the general ability of Congress to withhold review but avoided the
strict application of that rule. Estep involved another wartime stat-
ute, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.147 Estep was a
Jehovah's Witness who claimed religious exemption from the draft
under the "regular or duly ordained ministers of religion" excep-
tion. 148 The local draft board refused his claim, as did the appeal
board. 149 Estep then requested, under statutory procedure, that the
Selective Service administrative board appeal his case to the Presi-
dent. 50 The Board rejected this request, and Estep reported for
induction but subsequently refused to serve, claiming the religious
exemption.151
Estep was convicted for refusing to submit to the draft and was
sentenced to five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed
his sentence and ordered a new trial, holding that the Act validly
precluded review of draft board orders within their jurisdiction, 15 2
but that the Act did not intend to bar challenges to a board's exer-
cise of jurisdiction. 153 Thus, the Court held that an exception, al-
beit a narrow one, existed to the Act's no-review provisions: "The
question ofjurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is
no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant."1 54
Generally, then, the Court approved of the Act's scheme, which
"enlisted the aid of the federal courts only for enforcement pur-
poses."' 55 Justice Murphy attacked this apparent approval in a blis-
tering concurrence. 156
To sustain the convictions of the two petitioners in these cases
would require adherence to the proposition that a person may be
criminally punished without ever being accorded the opportunity
144 Hart, supra note 123, at 1379, stresses this point in discussing Yakus: "I don't
believe that courts can be given criminal jurisdiction and at the same time be told to
exercise it in violation of the Constitution."
145 321 U.S. at 467-68.
146 327 U.S. 114 (1945).
147 54 Stat. 894 (1946) (expired 1947), 50 U.S.C. app. § 311 (1988).
148 Id. § 5(d).
149 327 U.S. at 116.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 54 Stat. 894, § 10(a)(2)(1946) (expired 1947) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 311 (1988)).
153 327 U.S. at 121.
154 Id. at 122-23.
155 Id. at 119.
156 Id. at 125 (Murphy J., concurring).
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to prove that the prosecution is based upon an invalid administra-
tive order.... To sanction such a proposition is to place an indel-
ible. . . 'blot upon our jurisprudence and civilization.' 157
Justice Murphy denied that Congress's power over jurisdiction
included the power to require courts to "exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion without regard to due process of law or other individual
rights."' 5 8 According to Murphy, a court whose power did not in-
clude the ability to adjudicate all defenses raised by a criminal de-
fendant was not a court at all under the Constitution. Justice
Rutledge also concurred, echoing his Yakus dissent. 159
The wartime exigencies in both 'cases leave the scope of their
troubling implications in doubt. A federal court later observed that,
"Whether a legislative scheme similar... to that sustained in Yakus
could today withstand a constitutional challenge by a criminal de-
fendant is not settled by ,Yakus."' 16 0 When confronted with this di-
lemma, courts generally have been willing to employ sleight of hand
to avoid facing the issue in situations where a decision could not be
blamed on emergency wartime circumstances.
In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,' 6 ' for example, the Court
was confronted with a challenge to an emission standard promul-
gated by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air
Act.' 62 The Act's terms barred challenges to emission standards in
criminal prosecutions. This suit, however, challenged whether the
regulation was in fact an emission standard contemplated by the Act
at all.' 65 The Court permitted this challenge, in effect allowing the
use of judicial review to determine whether such review was
barred.164 The Court distinguished the intricate statutory scheme
of the Act from the broad mandate in Yakus.165 The Act contained a
broad spectrum of penalties: civil penalties for some actions, crimi-
nal penalties for others, and unreviewable penalties for still
others.' 66 The Court reasoned that the rule of lenity 67 required
that the defendant be allowed a determination of whether the regu-
lation at issue was what Congress envisioned as an "emission stan-
157 Id. at 125-26 (quoting McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. 259 (11 Wall.) 267
(1870)).
158 Id. at 127.
159 Id. at 132 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
160 United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981) (decided on other
grounds).
161 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
162 84 Stat. 1685 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988)).
163 434 U.S. at 277-78.
164 Id. at 279.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 280-82.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 26-35.
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dard."'168 The case evinces the Court's apparent discomfort with
denying all review to criminal defendants; certainly the decision did
not serve the efficiency policies behind Congress's preclusion of re-
view in the Act. 169
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, made explicit his unease with
barring criminal defendants from judicial review. 170 He perceived a
notice problem in no-review statutes since the fair warning owed to
criminal defendants is limited to the Federal Register.' 71 He con-
cluded that, "[I]t... is totally unrealistic to assume that more than a
fraction of the persons and entities affected by a regulation-espe-
cially small contractors scattered across the country-would have
knowledge of [the rule's] promulgation or familiarity with or access
to the Federal Register."' 172 Powell did not address the merits of a
direct challenge to the rule's validity, but distinguished Yakus be-
cause of its wartime circumstances. 75
Lower couris have also struggled with the no-review problem in
criminal prosecutions. In United States v. Emerson,174 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that
Congress intended preclusion, review must be granted to criminal
defendants who challenge regulations on constitutional grounds.' 75
Emerson was prosecuted for trafficking Ecstasy, a drug "temporar-
ily" placed on the schedule of illegal drugs by an officer of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). 176 The defendant challenged a
delegation within a delegation: Congress had delegated the power
to designate prohibited drugs to the Attorney General, who then
delegated that power to the DEA.' 77 Although the Controlled Sub-
stances Act' 78 precluded judicial review of schedule inclusion dur-
ing prosecution, the court held that potentially serious
constitutional problems could result from precluding review of
these issues. 179 The court found that this merited an exception in
168 434 U.S. at 284-85.
169 See id. at 292 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The Court's interpretation... conspicu-
ously frustrates the intent of Congress to establish a speedy and unified system ofjudi-
cial review under the Act.").
170 Id. at 289 (Powell, J., concurring).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 290.
173 Id.
174 846 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1988).
175 Id. at 544.
176 Id. at 542.
177 The delegation of the power to place drugs on the prohibited schedule to the
Attorney General has survived attack. United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840, 843-44 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978).
178 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
179 846 F.2d at 544.
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the absence of clear evidence to the contrary' 80 and allowed Emer-
son to present and win his challenge. The court held that the sub-
delegation of temporary schedule designation did not conform to
the requirements of the Act.181
More recently, however, the Ninth Circuit held that no review
was available to a defendant charged with selling advanced technol-
ogy without a permit. In United States v. Mandel,18 2 the defendant
was charged with exporting advanced-technology electronics in-
cluded on the Commerce Department's Commodity Control List
(CCL) without a license in violation of the Export Administration
Act of 1979.183 Mandel sought information through discovery that
would allow him to challenge whether the Department had "'fol-
lowed the legislative mandate.., in placing the items' . . . on the
CCL."18 4 The district court granted his request, reasoning that
under the no-basis-in-fact standard employed in Estep, judicial re-
view of agency rulemaking was always available in criminal
prosecutions.18 5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, noting
that review of an administrative act is required only when the act
affects the individual rights of the defendant, and when this effect
constitutes an element of the criminal offense charged.18 6 Neither
was true of Mandel. The court held that the administrative act at
issue was a rule of general applicability, and this rule was not an
element of the offense. The latter point, however, seems questiona-
ble; since the offense charged was a violation of a regulation
promulgated under the Act, the regulation's existence, at least, was
certainly an element of the offense. Moreover, the regulation in
Mandel concerned national security and foreign policy, historically
spheres where executive latitude is at a maximum. 187 Thus, once
again, exigent circumstances allowed a court to evade a square reso-
lution of what circumstances require a judicial review of administra-
tive action in a criminal trial.
180 Id. at 544.
181 Id. at 547-49.
182 914 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1990).
183 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(3) (1988).
184 914 F.2d at 1218.
185 Id. at 1220. The district court also relied on United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,
481 U.S. 828 (1987). See also United States v. Mandel, 696 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Cal.
1988).
186 914 F.2d at 1221.
187 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (holding that the Secretary of State's control
over the issuance of passports is legitimate in light of foreign policy concerns): United
States v. Moiler-Butcher. 560 F. Supp. 550 (D.C. Mass. 1983) (holding that Congress
may delegate more power in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs when a statute affects
imports).
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The Supreme Court has held, however, that judicial review of
administrative adjudications is required when those adjudications
form an element of a subsequent criminal prosecution. In United
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 18 8 the defendant was prosecuted for violating
the Immigration and Nationality Act'8 9 by returning to the United
States after a deportation proceeding. Mendoza-Lopez argued that
the administrative law judge in his deportation hearing violated his
due process rights by failing to advise him of his right to counsel
and other procedural rights. 190 The Act precluded judicial review of
the deportation hearing, 19 1 but the court held that a criminal defen-
dant must have the right to challenge a prior administrative hearing
if the hearing establishes an essential element of a subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution.192
Both Mendoza-Lopez and Emerson explicitly bar preclusion of ju-
dicial review of administrative actions that raise constitutional is-
sues, at least in the absence of "clear and convincing" evidence that
Congress intended to bar such review.193 Commentators have ar-
gued that this is the only proper exception to Congress's power to
withhold jurisdiction of the review of administrative actions.194 One
must therefore examine the constitutional dimensions of a challenge
that an administrative agency acted beyond the scope of its dele-
gated authority in promulgating a particular administrative crime.
With some exceptions, ultra vires challenges-those that claim an
agency has exceeded its delegated power-generally are not treated
by courts as constitutional in nature, 9 5 but the issue is close. Pro-
fessor Paul Verkuil has recommended the creation of a "sub-
nondelegation doctrine," to "ensur[e] that Congress' legislative
power, presumably satisfactorily delegated initially, is not redele-
gated beyond its intended limits."' 196 He also argues that "Ultra vires
188 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
189 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988).
190 481 U.S. at 831.
191 Id. at 835.
192 Ia at 839.
193 846 F.2d at 544.
194 See Verkuil, supra note 126, at 772-73; but see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Webster, Justice Scalia vehemently disagreed with the
majority's construction of the National Security Act, which precluded review of employ-
ment termination decisions by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to allow
review of colorable constitutional claims. The majority applied this construction in or-
der to avoid the "serious constitutional question" that a construction precluding such
review would raise. Id. at 603. Justice Scalia argued that congressional power over the
jurisdiction of federal courts includes the power to withhold jurisdiction, as Congress
sees fit, over some issues, including constitutional issues. Id. at 611. "[T]he power not
to create any lower federal courts at all includes the power to invest them with less than
all of the judicial power." Id.
195 Verkuil, supra note 126, at 751.
196 Id. at 753.
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issues ... are of a magnitude close enough to constitutional levels
that their foreclosure ought only to be accepted when Congress has
specifically made that determination." 197
In the criminal context, the ultra vires issue is of constitutional
dimension. In the civil realm, the delegation of administrative law-
making power is in part a recognition of what would be true anyway:
the executive has discretion in administering statutes, and with that
discretion comes the ability to decide policy, and thus law. 198 This
discretion, though, cannot operate in criminal cases, because ambi-
guities that create discretion in the civil context must be resolved in
favor of the defendant in the criminal realm. 199 Thus, the adminis-
trative promulgation of any rules defining a criminal penalty is valid
only insofar as Congress delegated such power to the agency, and
anything exceeding this is an unconstitutional usurpation.
The judicial power envisioned by Article III must include the
power to review a criminal defendant's challenge to the administra-
tive rule under which the defendant is prosecuted. 200 Without this
opportunity, the judiciary would be implicated in the unconstitu-
tional imposition of criminal sanctions. As Justice Murphy wrote in
Estep:
There is something basically wrong and unjust about a juridical
system that sanctions the imprisonment of a man without ever ac-
cording him the opportunity to claim that the charge made against
him is illegal. I am not yet willing to conclude that we have such a
system in this nation. Every fiber of the Constitution and every
legal principle of justice and fairness indicate otherwise. 20 1
-Furthermore, a no-review provision for an administrative crime
is not made constitutional by the opportunity to challenge a regula-
tion in a limited time and forum. It is no solace to a defendant fac-
ing prosecution under an arguably illegal rule to know that she
would have had the chance to challenge the rule had she thought of
it earlier. Nor is it comforting to know that the rule was in fact chal-
lenged by a civil litigant whose motives may differ greatly from a
defendant facing an actual criminal conviction. Indeed, real reason
exists to doubt whether a judge presiding over a civil challenge to a
regulation punishable by criminal penalties will evaluate the rule in
the same light as he might in a criminal trial, where the stakes are
more apparent. 202 Thus, a criminal defendant's due process rights
197 Id.
198 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 26-35.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
201 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 131 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
202 See National Rifle Ass'n v. Brady, 914 F.2d 475, 479 n.9 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 11 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). The Brady court dismissed a civil litigant's claim that a
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must include the ability to raise constitutional claims at trial, includ-
ing ultra vires claims, which attack the validity of administrative
crimes.
B. Scope of Review
1. The Chevron Approach
As the foregoing suggests, judicial review of administrative
rule-making should play a crucial role in ensuring the validity of
agency regulations. The Supreme Court, however, sharply curtailed
that role in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.20 3
Chevron concerned regulations promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977.204 The Act required certain states to issue permits before al-
lowing the construction or modification of "major stationary
sources" of pollution.20 5 The EPA's regulations defined "stationary
source" to include all polluting components of a single plant; this
"bubble" concept of "stationary source" allowed industries to add
or modify polluting facilities without a permit so long as the change
did not increase the aggregate pollution output of the plant.20 6 The
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sued to set aside the
regulations.20 7
In ruling for the NRDC, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia found that neither the language nor the legislative history
of the Act settled the meaning of "stationary source." 208 Instead,
the court's decision rested on the purposes of the 1977 amendments
to the Act. The court reasoned that the Act was designed to im-
prove air quality and, therefore, the EPA's bubble concept of "sta-
tionary source," which merely preserved the status quo within a
given plant, conflicted with the purposes of the Act.20 9
Reversing the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court
devised a two-step test for challenges that assert an agency has mis-
construed its organic statute. First, the reviewing court must deter-
mine whether Congress has spoken with clear intent on the precise
rule whose violation could be punished criminally was ultra vires, in part because the
issue arose in a civil trial where the special concerns of a criminal prosecution were not
present.
203 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
204 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(1988)).
205 Id. § 172(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1988).
206 467 U.S. at 840.
207 Id. at 841.
208 National Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
209 Id. at 726.
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issue at hand; if it has, that intention controls. 210 If Congress is si-
lent on the issue, the court must decide whether the agency's inter-
pretation of its enabling statute is within a permissible construction
of that statute.21' The latter determination should be made with
substantial deference to the agency's construction of the statute:
"[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive depart-
ment's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter. ' 212 Agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the Act did not
explicitly define "stationary source," the Supreme Court held that
the EPA's resolution was reasonable, and thus warranted
deference. 213
The Chevron approach has been the subject of considerable de-
bate by commentators. 21 4 Those favoring the Chevron test have ar-
gued that "interpretation" is a chimerical concept in cases when
Congress does not speak precisely to particular issues, because in
such cases there are no laws to interpret, only policy choices to
make.215 Some argue that, in such a situation, deference to agencies
is appropriate, because Congress, in delegating power to agencies,
has indicated it wants them to define these issues, and because agen-
cies are better situated politically than courts to resolve policy deci-
sions. Agency heads, at least, can be removed by the President for
210 467 U.S. at 842-43.
211 Id. at 843.
212 Id. at 844.
213 Id at 845.
214 For arguments approving of Chevron, see DeLong, supra note 85; Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath." Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutoy
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988); Starr, supra note 119. For arguments against
Chevron, see Aman, supra note 24; Farina, supra note 73; Sunstein, supra note 77. Profes-
sor Davis regards Chevron as "extraordinarily inspiring in one aspect and extremely dis-
couraging in another aspect." DAvis, supra note 106, § 29.16-10, at 524. He views the
.Court's recognition that a new presidential administration's opinions on policy are valid
considerations in agency decisionmaking as "[u]nprecedented... entirely welcome...
realistic, and inspiring." Id. § 29.16-9, at 522-23. On the other hand, Davis considers
the Court's conclusion that all reasonable agency interpretations of organic statutes are
entitled to deference a "purposeful abuse of power" that "exceeded its Constitutional
power, and .. .violated a fundamental of democratic government." Id. § 29.16-2 to
.16-8, at 510-21. Davis's view rests on his opinion that the language of § 706 of the
APA, mandating that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,"
clearly contradicts the Court's deferential approach to agency interpretations of law.
Interestingly, Davis considers the holding of Chevron both acceptable and entirely
unremarkable, reading the EPA's regulation as a legislative rule of the type always af-
forded the force of law. The fact that among the major commentators on Chevron only
Davis puts any weight on the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules seems
to indicate either the difficulty in distinguishing which type of rule is involved in a given
case, or the waning importance of distinguishing between the two.
215 See Pierce, supra note 68. This argument would reconcile Chevron with Davis's
interpretation of § 706 of the APA, which requires courts to decide all issues of law
arising from the review of agency action. See supra note 214. If there is no law to apply,
§ 706 is inapposite.
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unpopular decision-making, while courts are insulated from the
ramifications of their actions.2 16
In response, commentators have argued that the Chevron system
of allocating accountability for policy choices ignores the Constitu-
tion's resolution of the separation of powers question. 217 Professor
Cynthia Farnia has argued that whether it is truly possible to sepa-
rate interpretation, or saying what the law is, from legislation, or
saying what the law should be, is not the relevant inquiry.218 The
Constitution, as interpreted since Marbury v. Madison,219 recognizes
a difference between the two, and the proper role of the courts is to
resolve questions of interpretation.220 Indeed, if interpretation
were limited to only precise issues clearly resolved by the legisla-
ture, the much-vaunted judicial expertise in matters of statutory re-
view would seem rather superfluous.
Nevertheless, the Chevron standard is now firmly entrenched.
The Supreme Court has steadfastly pledged its allegiance to the
Chevron test, although differences amongst the Court's members
about its application have prompted occasional claims of "eviscera-
tion" of the test,22' or overly formalistic applications that "trivial-
ize[] the art of judging."222
216 See Pierce, supra note 214, at 307-08. See also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and
the Administrative State, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 26 (1983) (arguing that deference is a natu-
ral adjunct to the nondelegation doctrine, because the upholding of delegations and
deferrence to agency interpretations are recognitions of the power delegated to agen-
cies to make law).
217 See Farina, supra note 73, at 498.
218 Farina, supra note 73, at 477.
219 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
220 Farina, supra note 73, at 477-78.
221 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
This case concerned an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1988), which allowed aliens to petition for asylum upon a showing of a "well
founded fear" of persecution if deported. The majority found that an immigration
judge's decision that § 208(a) of the Act required a showing of a "clear probability of
persecution" was contrary to the Act. 480 U.S. at 423-24. Justice Scalia agreed, reason-
ing that the language of the Act settled the question, but took umbrage with the Court's
exhaustive search of the legislative history and its apparent belief that deference is un-
necessary "whenever, '[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,' [the
Court is] able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute." Id. at
454. Since Chevron requires deference whenever Congress has not clearly expressed its
intention on the precise matter at hand, Scalia deemed the Court's opinion "flatly incon-
sistent" with Chevron. Id.
222 Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1985) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). In Young, the Court reviewed a regulation promulgated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) under the authority of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
21 U.S.C. § 346 (1988). At issue was the effect of the phrase "to such extent" in relation
to the command that the Secretary of the FDA "shall promulgate" certain safety stan-
dards. 476 U.S. at 977. The Court held that the FDA's conclusion that the phrase "to
such extent" modified the phrase "shall promulgate," thereby giving the agency discre-
tion to not promulgate rules, was reasonable because although "Congress . . .was
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While generally adhering to Chevron, the Court has delineated
some areas where the policies behind deference either do not apply,
or are outweighed by more important policies. In Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Coun-
cil,223 the Supreme Court recently held that agency interpretations
in a non-rulemaking context were not entitled to deference if they
raised constitutional issues. 224 In DeBartolo, the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) issued an order restraining a union from dis-
tributing leaflets to shoppers at a shopping mall whose contractor
was alleged to pay substandard wages. This practice was said to be
"coercive" 225 within the meaning of -the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).226
In affirming the Eleventh Circuit's reversal of the NLRB deci-
sion, the Supreme Court did not hold that the agency's decision vio-
lated the First Amendment.227 Rather, the Court stated that its
long-standing policy of interpreting so as to avoid serious constitu-
tional issues whenever reasonably possible outweighed the policy
behind deference. 228 Thus, the Court recognized that the policies
implemented through Chevron deference could be trumped if other,
more important policies are at issue.
Furthermore, Chevron deference is not appropriate when per-
haps the main policy for deference is inapplicable: recognition of
congressional trust in agency expertise.229 In Bowen v. American Hos-
pital Ass'n,230 a plurality of the Court held that regulations promul-
speaking directly to the precise question at issue in this case, [it did not] unambiguously
express[] its intent." Id. at 980. This was despite the Court's agreement that the con-
trary interpretation "may seem to some to be the more natural interpretation." Id. Jus-
tice Stevens blasted the majority's rigidity in applying Chevron, arguing that the
majority's level of deference was tantamount to an abdication of the judicial role. Id. at
988.
223 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
224 See id. at 575.
225 Id. at 574.
226 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
227 485 U.S. at 575-76.
228 Id. at 576.
229 The Chevron policy is in reality a hybrid of the policies advanced by the two
schools of thought on agencies and the separation of powers. See supra notes 71-90 and
accompanying text. Thus, when Justice Stevens wrote in Chevron that "the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations 'has been consistently followed ... whenever
... a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations,'" 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,
382-83 (1961)), he reiterated the old school's faith in administrative deference. But
when he wrote that, "[w]hen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provi-
sion ... centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy .... federal judges-who have no
constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do,"
Id. at 866, the new school's accountability based analysis was clearly at work.
230 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
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gated by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) under the authority of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973231 were not entitled to deference. The Court reasoned that
this was appropriate because the Act granted directors of all federal
agencies the same authority to promulgate rules prohibiting dis-
crimination against the handicapped. 23 2 Because Congress had not
entrusted the HHS with administering the Act to any special degree,
the Court held that there was "not the same basis for deference
predicated on expertise as we found ... in Chevron." 23 -3
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
held that even when an agency is entrusted to administer an act, this
interpretation is entitled to no deference if it concerns a common-
law term over which the agency has no particular expertise. 23 4
Thus, even though an agency's interpretation of its organic statute
generally deserves deference, that policy extends only to areas of
the statute that implicate agency expertise. The following Section
argues that, when criminal penalties are involved, agency expertise
is not implicated, and, moreover, that the competing policies appli-
cable in the criminal context outweigh the diluted Chevron policies.
2. Why the Chevron Standard is Inapposite to Administrative
Crimes
A host of arguments have been advanced to support the defer-
ential Chevron regime ofjudicial review. The expertise and flexibility
that make agencies useful in a general sense are said to warrant def-
erence, lest inexpert courts clumsily destroy those advantages.
Moreover, agencies are said to deserve deference because of demo-
cratic principles: Congress, the most democratic branch, delegates
power to administrative agencies, which are indirectly accountable
politically, making intervention on the part of the judiciary, which is
even less politically accountable, inappropriate. 23 5 These argu-
ments, however, make far less sense in the context of review of ad-
ministrative crimes. Furthermore, policies peculiar to criminal law
outweigh the diluted policies behind the general deferential review
scheme of Chevron.
231 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
232 476 U.S. at 642.
233 Id. at 642 n.30.
234 Aurora Packing Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73,75 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (NLRB's interpre-
tation of the scope of the word "employee" was not entitled to deference because Con-
gress wanted the term to retain its common law meaning, and the NLRB had no
expertise with the common law). See also Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1989)
(interpretations of states responsible for administering federal statutes entitled to no
deference, because they do not possess expertise in the sense that federal agencies do).
235 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 68, at 506.
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According to the traditional school,236 agencies have two major
virtues that Congress lacks: special expertise and increased flexibil-
ity. While increased scrutiny for agency rules might hamper these
valuable characteristics, both attributes lose significance when crimi-
nal regulations are implicated. An agency's expertise in determin-
ing how best to regulate an area does not apply as well in the
criminal context, which traditionally reflects community approba-
tion. Agencies do not have any special insight into determining
community values.
It might be argued that agencies' expertise comes into play in
determining which actions within a particular area so warrant deter-
rence that a criminal penalty is needed; indeed, this argument seems
necessary to explain why administrative crimes are ever allowed. But
even if predominant, deterrence cannot be the sole rationale for a
criminal rule, because otherwise a civil penalty would suffice. As-
suming then that some element of approbation remains in even de-
terrence-based administrative crimes,23 7 it can also be assumed that
Congress, in defining the sphere of agency rules that are criminally
punishable, supplies the needed stamp of blame. When an agency
goes beyond the boundaries Congress enacts, however, the only
source for the determination that the prohibited conduct is blame-
worthy is the agency itself. In noncriminal situations, such regula-
tion beyond the scope of what Congress envisioned is considered
permissible, if reasonable, because the expert agency is presumed to
have a better idea of proper action than the reviewing court.238 In
the context of administrative crimes, however, the problem remains
that-agencies are simply not experts on community approbation.
Consequently, the only way to argue that the agency expertise ra-
tionale is not undermined in this context is to contend that deter-
rence is the only justification for such crimes. In light of the fact that
many administrative crimes are punishable by imprisonment, this
argument seems untenable.239
236 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
237 Cf. Malcolm E. Wheeler, Manufacturers' Criminal Liability, in Louis FRUMER & MEL-
VIN FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS Lmi.arv § 1B.06 (1984) (suggesting that potential defend-
ants' fear of the approbation and stigma associated with criminal conviction is a factor
lawmakers believe will increase deterrence and justify the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions for marketing unsafe products).
238 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (agencies are preferable to courts for making policy
decisions unresolved by Congress because they have "great expertise and [are] charged
with responsibility for administering the [statute,] ... [whereas] O]udges are not experts
in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.").
239 H.L. Packer has argued that creating crimes whose sole purpose is deterrence is
unwise apart from the inherent unfairness of imprisoning people who have done noth-
ing culpable. His argument is that deterrence is a "complex psychological phenome-
non" that requires both fear of punishment and recognition of societal blame, so that
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Moreover, the greater flexibility of agencies relative to that of
Congress does not warrant deferring to agency judgment in the
criminal context. It has been argued that the Constitution places
procedural limitations on congressional lawmaking power so that
the burdens on freedom represented by any law are more difficult to
construct. 240 This argument applies even more strongly in the crim-
inal context: declaring specific conduct so blameworthy as to de-
serve a criminal sanction should be possible only after running the
gauntlet of political processes required by congressional lawmaking,
but not for administrative rulemaking. 24' When criminal punish-
ment is involved, flexibility is not a virtue.
The new school 242 considers deference appropriate because,
when Congress has failed to address an issue, someone must fill in
the gaps, and in effect, make the law. Agencies are preferable be-
cause they are more politically accountable than courts. 243 How-
ever, when the protection of criminal rights, like the protection of
other constitutional rights, is involved, political accountability is not
the critical inquiry. The concept of protected rights includes the
idea of protection from the potential majoritarian tyranny that polit-
ical accountability necessarily cannot control. It is entirely appro-
priate, therefore, that when Congress has left open an issue
concerning criminal law, the courts close it by holding that no crime
has been created. When criminal penalties are involved, the law
must err in favor of the defendant.
While the policies supporting deference to agency interpreta-
tions seem less persuasive in the criminal context, a host of policies
and concerns particular to criminal defendants emerge at full
strength against deference to administrative agencies. The rule of
lenity, for example, militates toward applying regulatory statutes in
the light most favorable to the criminal defendant.244 The require-
ment of fair warning cautions against convicting a defendant based
on a regulation buried in the Federal Register.245 Fundamental fair-
ness notions favor an independent and impartial adjudicator for
each of a criminal defendant's arguments, but deference, in effect,
allows the agency that creates a rule to determine its validity. 246 In
deterrence simply cannot work in the criminal context with culpability. PACKER, supra
note 13, at 65.
240 See Farina, supra note 73, at 508.
241 See supra note 81.
242 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
243 Id.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 26-35.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
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short, the policies favoring deference seem quite unpersuasive,
while those favoring full-scale, de novo review seem compelling.
Some courts have suggested what this Note argues-that chal-
lenges to agency interpretations raised in criminal prosecutions are
not entitled to Chevron deference. In United States v. McGoff,247 Judge
Kenneth Starr of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
generally a supporter of the Chevron framework, 248 wrote that the
rights at stake for criminal defendants are "far outside Chevron terri-
tory," 249 and that agency interpretations are entitled to no defer-
ence in criminal prosecutions. 250 McGoff involved the prosecution
of a South African agent, who sought to acquire American media
properties, for failure to register under the Foreign Agents Regis-
tration Act of 1938.251 Though encouraging, Judge Starr's strong
language was broad dictum; the case concerned an interpretation by
the Justice Department, not an agency charged with administering
the statute,252 and the interpretation was never advanced prior to
the immediate litigation.253 Nonetheless, McGoff illustrates that
some judges recognize a problem in deferring to agency interpreta-
tions of statutes when criminal charges are involved.
In National Rifle Ass'n v. Brady,254 the National Rifle Association
(NRA), in a civil proceeding, challenged gun control regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Fourth Circuit
upheld the regulations, promulgated under the Gun Control Act of
1968,255 which punished violations with criminal penalties. In so
doing, the court used the Chevron standard of review and rejected
the NRA's contention that administrative crimes were not entitled to
deference.2 56 The court noted, however, that the issue arose in the
context of civil litigation rather than during a criminal prosecu-
tion.25 7 This comment implicitly suggests that had the challenge
been brought in a criminal prosecution, the result might have been
different.
Many of the cases ... on which the NRA relies in making this
argument involve the application of the rule of lenity in criminal
247 831 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
248 See Starr, supra note 119.
249 831 F.2d at 1077.
250 Id. at 1084.
251 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1988).
252 See supra text accompanying notes 71-76, 229-33.
253 Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (post hoc explanations for agency action advanced by agency counsel during litiga-
tion are irrelevant for judicial review purposes).
254 914 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1990).
255 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1988).
256 914 F.2d at 478.
257 Id. at 479 n.3.
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prosecutions and are simply inapposite to questions of deference
to agency regulations. . . . In addition . . . the government
properly notes that any disputes over [the validity of the regula-
tions] are far more likely to arise in [civil] contests... than in a
criminal courtroom. The usual level of deference is therefore
appropriate. 258
Thus, because this litigation was civil, as is most litigation likely
to arise under the regulations, deference was proper. The court im-
plied that had this been a criminal prosecution, deference, and not
the rule of lenity, would have been "simply inapposite." 259
Chevron stands for the proposition that when someone other
than Congress must decide what the law is, administrative agencies,
with their particular expertise and greater political accountability,
are better actors than the courts. Whether one agrees with this ap-
proach in general is irrelevant to administrative crimes, because the
policies supporting deference simply do not apply in this context. 260
Agencies are not experts in assessing the societal mores underlying
criminal law. Nor does the purported accountability advantage of
the agencies merit deference when crimes are involved; if Congress
is not clearly accountable for a criminal proscription, the solution is
not to determine which of the remaining branches is more accounta-
ble, but rather to hold that no crime exists. Finally, the policies sup-
porting special treatment for all criminal rules outweigh any
remaining vitality of the Chevron policies. Chevron thus has no place
in the review of administrative crimes.
IV
A PROPOSED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
CRIMES
This Note argues that the Constitution requires independent
judicial review of the validity of administrative crimes in the context
of a criminal prosecution, and that the policies advanced by defer-
ence to agency interpretations warrant less consideration in the
criminal context. Consequently, in a criminal prosecution for viola-
tion of an administratively defined crime, the defendant should be
allowed a de novo review of the regulation's validity. The judge
should independently evaluate whether a rule is valid under the
Constitution and its organic statute. This ensures that a defendant
can only be punished under a law for which Congress, at least indi-
rectly, can be held accountable. It also protects the defendant's
right to a fundamentally fair trial before an impartial adjudicator.
258 Id. at 480 n.3. (emphasis added).
259 Id.
260 See supra notes 236-46 and accompanying text.
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A. A Hypothetical Application of the Proposed Standard
To illustrate the proposed standard of review, recall the regula-
tory scheme in United States v. Mandel.26' The Export Administration
Act of 1979262 delegated to the Secretary of Commerce authority to
designate items on a Commodity Control List (CCL), exports of
which, without a license, were punishable by up to five years in
prison.263 The Secretary's decision was guided by a list of statutory
criteria concerning the availability of an item on foreign markets.264
The Secretary was required to review items on the CCL periodically,
but an item's inclusion on the list was barred from review in criminal
prosecutions. 265
Suppose the Secretary chose to bar exports of computerized
cutlery to Japan by including such exports on the CCL, believing
that this punitive measure would ultimately foster the United
States's foreign policy goal of free trade.266 Suppose also that an
industrious inventor, Xerxes, managed to perfect the Carving Wiz-
ard, a kitchen carving knife requiring no human skill, and decided to
peddle his wares in the Japanese market. Suppose further that the
Justice Department learned of this entrepreneur's scheme, and
chose to prosecute him.
Under the current regime, Xerxes would have no defense: he
sold CCL goods without a permit and thus would be guilty. Under
the arguments advanced in Part III. A. of this Note, however, Xerxes
would have a due process right to attack the validity of the rule. If
the court applied a deferential standard of review, the mere ability
to challenge the rule would be of little value, because the Act leaves
the determination of what is detrimental to competitiveness up to
the Secretary, and unreasonableness is difficult to prove to a defer-
ential court.267 Under the proposed standard, however, the review-
ing court, considering the validity question de novo, would employ
traditional statutory construction methods. Based on these meth-
ods, the court would determine that Congress did not intend to au-
261 914 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 182-87.
262 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-2420 (1988).
263 It § 2410(b).
264 914 F.2d at 1217.
265 Id. at 1220; 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412 n.8 (1988).
266 This is one of the grounds authorizing the Secretary to include items on the CCL
50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (1988).
267 A deferential regime would make challenges under the Export Administration
Act particularly difficult, since the Secretary's decisions are in the nature of a political
question and therefore are "not subject to review to determine whether [they] had a
basis in fact." 914 F.2d at 1223.
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thorize CCL inclusion of gadgets of primarily consumer interest.2 68
Xerxes would go free, and an unjust result would be avoided.
B. A-Refutation of Likely Counter-Arguments to the Proposed
Standard
Beneath the traditional notion that administrative crimes do not
deserve particularly close scrutiny lurks the idea that administrative
crimes are not "really" crimes at all: they generally involve behavior
not culpable in a classical sense, and they are often invoked against
corporations rather than individuals.2 69 Thus, advocates of criminal
penalties for administrative crime reject the traditional philosophy
that criminals are outcasts shunned by society and that criminal pen-
alties "should be reserved for what really matters." 270 The adminis-
trative paradigm, however, ignores the real differences that remain
between civil and criminal penalties.
The simple fact that criminal penalties are generally more se-
vere than their civil counterparts makes it more important that every
element of the offense-including the validity of any regulation de-
fining its terms-be proven. Additionally, a conviction for a crimi-
nal offense can have disastrous collateral estoppel effects.2 71 In
prosecutions involving administrative crimes, the defendant is often
a corporation which may face a daunting array of civil actions for the
conduct underlying the criminal prosecution.2 72 Stigma or not, a
defendant in such a situation has every right to expect a fair deter-
mination that the criminal prosecution rests on a regulation enacted
in accordance with the law. Finally, while this of course cannot be
proved, it does not seem that the stigma of the criminal conviction
has disappeared, even in prosecutions under statutes that do not
immediately seem to govern particularly shunned conduct, as exem-
plified by some of the recent prosecutions of Wall Street figures. 273
268 Legislative history evinces congressional desire to limit foreign policy export
controls to rare situations when such controls might provide an effective and necessary
United States response. See S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-9 (1979), reprinted in
1979 U.S.C.G.A.N. 1147, 1152-1155.
269 Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (discussing why strict liabil-
ity is appropriate for "public welfare offenses," as contrasted with traditional common-
law crimes).
270 See PACKER, supra note 13.
271 See Jonathan C. Tha, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determinations:
Theoretical, Practical and Strategic Implications for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70 GEO. LJ.
1079 (1982).
272 For example, the Exxon Valdez oil spill resulted in hundreds of civil actions against
Exxon, all of which might have been automatically successful if Exxon had lost the crimi-
nal case brought against it. See The Legal Reef Ahead for Exxon, Bus. WK., Mar. 12, 1990.
273 See, e.g., Paul Richter, Wall St. Scandal Leaves so Many to Cope with Shame, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1988, at 1 (Business Section).
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CONCLUSION
The jurisprudential foundation for modern administrative law
maintains that agencies only follow the instructions, however gen-
eral, given to them by Congress. .The modern approach of judicial
deference in the review of administrative interpretations ignores the
role of courts in monitoring this delegation by allowing agencies to,
in effect, determine the parameters of their own powers. Whatever
the reasons for this system in the larger sense, it is inappropriate in
the context of regulations defining criminal conduct. The policies
supporting judicial deference in general-recognition of expertise
and favoring the policy determinations of executive agencies over
courts-are of lesser significance when criminal prosecutions are in-
volved. Moreover, a host of special concerns for criminal defend-
ants are at issue in the context of administrative crimes. In
recognition of these concerns, courts should employ a de novo stan-
dard of review whenever the validity of administratively defined
criminal penalties is challenged.
Mark D. Alexander
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